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1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                                                   
No. 05-3546
                                              
RONALD REYN LUMENTA, TINA MELINA,
 and TAMMY REYNALDA,
Petitioners
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                         Respondent 
____________
ON REVIEW OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER 
OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(BIA Nos. A-96-262-369; 96-262-370; 96-262-371)
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2006
Before: SMITH, WEIS and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
         (Filed: August 4, 2006)
____________
OPINION
                              
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Ronald Reyn Lumenta appeals the June 29, 2005 Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)’s opinion
 Lumenta is the lead applicant for asylum.  The applications of Tina1
Melina, Lumenta’s wife, and Tammy Reynalda, Lumenta’s daughter, are derivative of
Lumenta’s application.
2
and order denying Lumenta’s application for asylum.   Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we1
have jurisdiction over this petition for review of the BIA’s final determination.  We will
deny the petition for review.  
Lumenta is a native of Indonesia and is a Christian.  He entered the United
States in February 2002 and overstayed his visa.  After conceding that he was removable,
Lumenta appeared at a hearing before the IJ and asserted claims for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Lumenta
contended that if he returned to Indonesia, he would face persecution because he was
Christian.  He has not appealed the denial of his requests for withholding of removal and
relief under CAT.  
Lumenta testified that in 1999 he was a patient in a mental health clinic at
the Doulos compound in Indonesia when Muslim extremists attacked the compound and
set it ablaze.  He further testified that, as a result of this incident, he was traumatized and
feared that “the Muslims will mistreat me” if he returned to Indonesia.  He did not testify
that any of the individuals who attacked the facility were associated with the Indonesian
government, nor did he testify that he feared persecution from the Indonesian
government.
3Where, as here, the BIA affirms and adopts the IJ's decision we review the
IJ's decision as if it were the decision of the BIA.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4); Dia v.
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003).  We apply the substantial evidence test to
determinations of whether an alien has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded
fear of future persecution.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The substantial evidence test is
also applied to credibility determinations.  Id. at 272 (citing Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143
F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We must uphold an adverse credibility appraisal “unless
‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Id. (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
Asylum may be granted to “a person unable or unwilling to return to the
country of that person's nationality or habitual residence because of past persecution or
because of a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Id. at 271-72
(3d Cir. 2002).  The applicant for asylum bears the burden of demonstrating that he has
been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Chen v. INS, 344
F.3d 272, 274 (3d Cir. 2003).
Even if the petitioner’s testimony about the attack on the mental institution
was credible, substantial evidence supported the IJ’s determination that Lumenta did not
meet his burden of demonstrating that he had been persecuted or that he had a well-
4founded fear of future persecution.  He has not presented any individualized evidence that
he has been, or would be, singled out for persecution.  See, e.g., Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d
530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that an alien was not entitled to asylum where she
“failed to establish either that she faces an individualized risk of persecution or that there
is a ‘pattern or practice’ of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia”). 
 Lumenta presented no evidence that the attack on the facility was in any
way tied to his presence there or that he was likely to be persecuted if he returned to
Indonesia.  In fact, he returned to  Indonesia for several months following his first stay in
the United States in 2001 and did not encounter any problems.
Because we have determined that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
finding that Lumenta was not entitled to asylum, we need not reach the issue of whether
his application for asylum was time-barred.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
